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I. INTRODUCTION
The public believes that the practice of law has become a business.
They also believe that lawyers are in the profession for the money and
that everything a law firm does is motivated by greed-well not every-
thing, in L.A. Law lawyers are motivated by greed and lust. Allegedly,
lawyers overcharge, create work, and delay in order to make more
money. In return lawyers produce nothing useful; they do not make
cars, steel, or heavy machinery. They are perceived by many as social
parasites who make a handsome living off the productive labor of
others. Economists note that the United States' workforce has a higher
percentage of lawyers than that of Japan.' Economists argue that it
would be better for American business if more of our best and brightest
would be engineers rather than lawyers.' Arguably, lawyers merely re-
distribute income. Because the best lawyers work for powerful corpora-
tions where the money is, the legal profession as a whole shifts money
from the poor to the rich.' The public perceives lawyers as being worse
than business people because in addition to being motivated by
greed-as business people are-lawyers produce nothing useful.
The public's perception is easily dismissed as being uninformed.
* Director, Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware; author, BusiNixss ETHICS
(1982).
1. See R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 159 (1983).
2. Id.
3. One corporate attorney argues that the public's perceptions are too simplified. For in-
stance, corporate attorneys sometimes prevent corporations from taking actions they want to
take-actions that would benefit the corporation at the expense of the poor.
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Whenever the public, correctly or incorrectly, suspects the motives of a
profession, it is prudent that the profession sit up and take notice. Ap-
parently some members of the American Bar Association have taken
notice. In 1986 the Commission on Professionalism issued a report to
the House of Delegates. The report challenged lawyers to "restor[e] a
high level of professionalism . . . both in fact and in the perception of
others."4 The report begins by posing the question of whether the legal
profession has abandoned principle for profit and professionalism for
commercialism. 5 The report catalogues the reasons why the general
public answers that question in the affirmative. First, lawyers are
blamed for some serious social problems-for example, medical mal-
practice litigation and the skyrocketing price of liability insurance in
general.' Second, litigation is seen to consume vast quantities of time
and money.7 Third, lawyers are lacking in character."
The Commission makes a number of recommendations for law
schools, the practicing bar, bar associations, and judges: (1) preserve
and develop within the profession integrity, competence, fairness, inde-
pendence, courage and a devotion to the public interest; (2) resolve to
abide by higher standards of conduct than the minimum required by
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct; (3) increase the participation of lawyers in pro bono
activities and help lawyers recognize their obligation to participate; (4)
resist the temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a primary goal
of law practice; (5) encourage innovative methods that simplify and
make less expensive the rendering of legal services; (6) educate the pub-
lic about legal processes and the legal system; and (7) resolve to employ
all the organizational resources necessary in order to assure that the
legal profession is effectively self-regulating.9
These recommendations must be put into a theoretical framework.
The remainder of this Article seeks to establish the rationale for adopt-
ing these recommendations. Part II of this Article provides the classic
account of a professional. This account demonstrates why so many peo-
ple no longer view lawyers as professionals. Part III compares the tradi-
tional view of the profession with the traditional view of business. It is
undesirable for lawyers to behave like traditional business persons.
4. American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism, ". . . In the Spirit of Public
Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243,
250 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 251.
6. Id. at 253.
7. Id. at 253-54.
8. Id. at 254.
9. Id. at 296-304.
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Rather, business should abandon the traditional business model and
seek to become a profession. The motto of the Harvard Business
School, "To Make Business a Profession," should be taken seriously.
Only if business becomes a profession will a trend for the law to emu-
late business be a good one. Part IV describes what constitutes a pro-
fessional commitment to altruism in the law. Part V criticizes the
economic analysis of law as being especially detrimental and a major
contributor to the legal profession's current problems.
II. THE DEFINITION OF A PROFESSION
Abraham Flexner ° gave the classic definition of a profession over
seventy years ago. To qualify as a profession Flexner claimed that an
occupation must: (1) possess and draw upon a store of knowledge that
was more than ordinarily complex; (2) secure a theoretical grasp of the
phenomena with which it dealt; (3) apply its theoretical and complex
knowledge to the practical solution of human and social problems; (4)
strive to add to and improve its stock of knowledge; (5) pass on what it
knew to novice generations not in a haphazard fashion but deliberately
and formally; (6) establish criteria of admission, legitimate practice, and
proper conduct; and (7) be imbued with an altruistic spirit."
The traditional professions were medicine, law, teaching, and the
ministry. Since the remuneration for teaching and the ministry was low
seventy years ago and has remained relatively low, little doubt exists
that teaching and the ministry easily meet the definition. Doctors and
lawyers have always done relatively well financially, and hence, it has
been incumbent upon them to prove that their primary motivation was
altruism.
In both medicine and law, the general practitioner is disappearing.
Individual lawyers are specializing in particular areas of the law and are
joining large multipurpose law firms or corporate legal staffs. If this
were all that "law becoming a business" amounted to, there would not
be much concern. The tendency to organize into multiple practice firms
is driven less by the efficiencies of business practice than by the re-
quirements of specialization. Indeed, the requirements of the profession
may mandate specialization-Flexner's first four criteria for a profes-
sion require the mastery of a complex body of knowledge. Moreover,
Walter Metzger, addressing the question "What Is A Profession?," ar-
gued that "the paramount function of professions .. .is to ease the
10. Flexner was an aide to the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations. See Flexner, Is Social
Work a Profession?, quoted in Metzger, What Is A Profession?, 52 C. & U. 42-45 (1976).
11. See Flexner, supra note 10.
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problems caused by the relentless growth of knowledge."' 2
Metzger casts the epistemological function into a moral frame-
work. 3 In a complex world, people become increasingly ignorant of in-
formation necessary to run their lives.14 The job of the professional is to
protect the client from his or her own ignorance. Metzger subscribes to
two interlocking propositions. The first proposition is that as the
amount of knowledge increases so does the amount of ignorance, since
each man can only know a decreasing fraction of what can be known.
The second proposition is that as knowledge grows more specialized, it
also grows more potent and more capable of being used for ill or good.'
5
In these interlocking propositions, Metzger spells out the relation
between professional knowledge and the altruistic spirit of a genuine
profession. The chief function of a professional is not to use her special-
ized knowledge to maximize her income; rather it is to use her special-
ized knowledge to protect ignorant clients from exploitation. What has
gone wrong with the law is that most lawyers are using their specialized
knowledge to enable the rich and powerful to exploit the poor and igno-
rant while enriching themselves in the process.
Metzger was hardly the first to urge lawyers to protect the inno-
cent. Louis D. Brandeis took a similar tact in a 1905 speech to the
Harvard Ethical Society.' Brandeis warned of the dangers of law be-
coming too closely allied with business. Brandeis believed that the great
opportunity of the American Bar is to protect the aspirations and inter-
ests of the people.' 7
12. See Metzger, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8-9. Metzger stated:
I subscribe to these interlinked propositions: that, as the amount of knowledge increases, so
too does the relative amount of ignorance, for each man can know only a decreasing fraction
of what can be known; that knowledge, as it grows more specialized, also tends to grow more
potent, more capable of being used for ill or good; that, as a consequence, there comes into
being not a mass society but a lay society - a society, that is, in which each is potentially at
the mercy of someone more thoroughly in the know; that these mutual dependencies grow
more dangerous as knowledge, which had once been held by holy men, kin and neighbors,
passes into the hands of strangers, and as the customary means of assuring its benign uses -
parental love, communal sanctions, religious discipline - tend increasingly not to work. It is to
avert a Hobbesian outcome that society urges occupations to tie their expertise to honorable-
ness, to accord even ignorance moral claims. In that urging the professional ideal is born.
Id.
16. L. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BusINEss---A PROFESSION (1914).
17. Id. at 323, 321. Brandeis stated:
The immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from which much trouble
will come to us unless the excesses of capital are curbed, through the respect for law, as the
excesses of democracy were curbed seventy-five years ago. There will come a revolt of the
people against the capitalists unless the aspirations of the people are given some adequate
legal expression; and to this end cooperation of the abler lawyers is essential. . . . We hear
[Vol. 41:7411744
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Inspired by Brandeis, Professor David Luban refers to Brandeis'
ideal as "progressive professionalism" and identifies six points consti-
tuting progressive professionalism: first, that professionalism is better
than commercialism; second, that lawyers are mediators between public
and private interest; third, that lawyers therefore have a special respon-
sibility to the common good; fourth, that the common good will be real-
ized by blunting class antagonisms within a fundamentally capitalist
framework; fifth, that in an era of high capitalism, class antagonisms
must be blunted by promoting the interests of the people against those
of the corporations; sixth, that lawyers are peculiarly suited by training
and cast of mind to this task.'8
A long tradition exists identifying the characteristics of a profes-
sion, and the most important characteristic is the altruistic spirit. The
problem with law becoming a business is not that lawyers are specializ-
ing and hence are becoming associated with larger firms. That trend is
inevitable and indeed required by the very purpose of a profession.
What is problematic is that even the pretense of altruistic motivation is
disappearing. It is not the personal wealth of lawyers that is offensive.
Plato stated that you can often do good and do well. 9 The greater con-
cern is that the profession's loss of altruistic motivation is contributing
to the gap between the rich and the poor in this country.
III. THE FUNCTION OF BusiNEss
Traditionally, business has not been viewed as a profession. The
chief characteristic that distinguishes it from a profession is the motiva-
tion of business people. Business people are egoistic; their primary mo-
tivation, according to economic theory, is to maximize their self-
interest. This lack of altruistic spirit is sufficient to distinguish business
from the professions.
Arguably, the competitive egoism of the market is better for the
public than altruism. Adam Smith is the father of this view and Milton
Friedman is the most famous of his progeny. Business contributes to
the public good whether or not it is considered a profession.
Lawyers might apply this same rationale. If lawyers give up the
pretense of being altruistically motivated and admit that they are in it
much of the "corporation lawyer" and far too little of the "people's lawyer." The great oppor-
tunity of the American Bar is and will be to stand again as it did in the past, ready to protect
also the interests of the people.
Id.
18. Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, supra 41 VAND. L. REV.
717, 725 (1988).
19. This is one of the central messages of Plato's Republic. In that work Plato argues that it
is never in a person's interest to be unjust-not even a tyrant.
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for the money, the public still benefits. Self-interest causes zealous cli-
ent advocacy, which in turn promotes legal justice. Through a kind of
"invisible hand"-the clash of lawyers jealously advocating client inter-
ests-the appropriate decision is reached. Lawyers increase their in-
come by defending their clients zealously but this zealous advocacy
contributes to the public good.
Smith and Friedman are wrong.20 The "invisible hand" argument is
not convincing in the case of lawyers. For example, zealous client advo-
cacy would require that an appropriate defense in a rape trial is to try
to show that the alleged victim was "a loose woman." Recently, a mur-
der trial was held in New York City in which the defendant alleged that
he accidentally killed his victim in self-defense.21 She became too rough
during their sexual encounter. The defense seemed spurious because
the defendant was a young, tall, athletic male, and his victim was a
rather petite female. Yet the defense attorney tried to buttress it by
establishing that the victim liked "kinky sex." Is it plausible to believe
that such zealous defenses are really in the public interest?
Moral doubts about the limits of zealous advocacy are not limited
to philosophers. The profession itself continues to debate the extent to
which a lawyer should serve as a zealous advocate for her client. How-
ever, even if zealous advocacy contributes to the public good, the egois-
tic motivation would be sufficient to prevent the law from being a
profession.
It may be of interest to lawyers to realize that many in the business
community argue that business persons should be more altruistic. 22
Business persons should not simply focus on maximizing profits. These
people argue that business persons should behave more like profession-
als in the classic sense and less like traditional business persons. Among
the more professional alternatives to the profit maximization theory are
the following:
1. The corporation should seek profits so long as it does not cause
avoidable harm or unduly infringe upon human rights;23
2. The corporation should seek to do social good as well as seek profit;24
20. See N. BowIE, BusiNEss ETHICS 18-31 (1982); see also N. BowmE, The Paradox of Profit,
in PAPERS ON THE ETHICS OF ADMINISTRATION (forthcoming).
21. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at B1, col. 5; see also Linden, The Preppie Killer Cops a Plea,
TIME, Apr. 4, 1988, at 22 (reporting that the defendant, Robert Chambers, pleaded guilty to first
degree manslaughter).
22. See infra notes 30-60.
23. See, e.g., J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR- UNIVERSITIES AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1972).




3. The corporation should seek to produce life sustaining and enhancing
goods and services; 25
4. The corporation should seek to maximize the interests of the various
corporate stakeholders rather than simply the interests of the
stockholders;26
5. The purpose of the corporation is to provide meaningful work for
employees. Each of these alternatives recognizes that there is more to
business than making a profit. Adoption of the first view, however, does
not go far enough in making business a profession; the motivation is
still not sufficiently altruistic. This view places the same type of limits
on business that are put on all other activities. 28 Applying this criterion,
any vocation can meet the moral dimension of professional conduct
simply by following a moral minimum. The problem with the second
view is that, in contrast with the first view, too much is asked rather
than too little. It imposes an open-ended obligation to do good. Hence,
a theory of the function of business that permits business to qualify as
a profession must be one of the last three.
The third view is preferable because it focuses on the human being
as producer. The corporation focuses on its employees-the producers
of the goods and services-rather than on its customers-the consumers
of the goods and services. The fourth theory is flawed because not all
stakeholders should be considered equal. Indeed, both economic and
ethical reasons exist in support of this view.29 The real success story of
American capitalism is its success in providing jobs for people because
people cannot develop fully as human beings unless they have a job.
But they need more than just a job. They need a job that enhances
their self-respect.
But this is not the place to defend one particular professional the-
ory of business over others. The adoption of any of the last four theo-
ries would change substantially the motivation for pursuing a career in
business. The adoption of any of those professional alternatives also
would change the focus of current business education. By focusing on
an altruistic goal rather than on profit maximization, business educa-
tion would meet the criterion that could enable business to be a profes-
sion in the traditional sense. Business disciplines already emphasize the
mastering of a specialized body of knowledge. Business disciplines are
highly quantified and esoteric. What is missing is any attempt to edu-
25. Camenisch, Business Ethics or Getting to the Heart of the Matter, 1 Bus. & PROF.
ETHICS J. 59, 59-69 (1981).
26. See R. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
27. See N. BowIE, The Paradox of Profit, supra note 20, for a defense of this view.
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. See N. BowiE, The Paradox of Profit, supra note 20.
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
cate for a spirit of altruism-the kind of education that is traditionally
associated with the liberal arts. Emphasizing the liberal arts indicates
which skills and attitudes the business community values. A knowledge
of our history, some knowledge of other cultures, but, most importantly,
some insight into what it means to lead a fully human life are the
hallmarks of the liberal arts education of business managers. Business
can carry out its function of providing meaningful work only if it under-
stands the ideals and aspirations of human life.
Just as there is a tendency for lawyers to think more like tradi-
tional business people, there is, ironically, an opposing trend for busi-
ness people to think less like traditional business people and more like
traditional professionals. Many business people are taking a more altru-
istic perspective. If the law were to emulate these business persons
rather than egoistically motivated business people, the convergence of
law and business would be productive.
IV. RECALLING THE ALTRUISTIC FUNCTION OF LAW
If the law is to remain a profession in the traditional sense, it must
not lose its traditional mission. That is the danger in the era of speciali-
zation, large firms, and association with corporate clients.
The functions of the law are: to enable a large mass of diversified
human beings to live together,"0 to serve as a repository of society's
most cherished values,3 and to promote justice.32 Lawyers behave al-
truistically so long as they enter the profession and make legal decisions
with an eye toward promoting human interaction, society's cherished
values, and justice.
In his important book The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller defines
"law" as "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules." 3 But to what end? To the end of enabling people to accom-
plish their objectives. Fuller then asks what the law must be like if it is
to accomplish its purpose. He sets out eight criteria that an effective
legal system must meet. Laws must be general, be clear, not require the
impossible, not be retroactive, not be contradictory, be constant
through time, be public, and be administered consistently with what
the law says. 4 This view of the law presupposes a certain concept of
human nature, whereby human beings are autonomous, responsible,
moral agents.3 5
30. See infra notes 33-59 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
33. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 109 (rev. ed. 1969).
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 162 (stating that "[t]o embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to
[Vol. 41:741
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Fuller adopts the approach of Greek philosophy that analyzes the
goodness of something in terms of its function.36 A good X is one that
performs its function well. A good legal system is one that enables the
members of society to accomplish their purposes-for example, making
wills, selling property, registering a motor vehicle. Fuller recognizes that
every legal system generally must meet certain criteria, which he calls
the "inner morality of law." He also recognizes that this view of the law
requires that we see human beings as autonomous, responsible, moral
agents. If human beings were robots or chickens, it wouldn't make any
sense to speak of goals and purposes. Rational agents have goals and
purposes because they make choices. Rational agents are autonomous.
But since they are autonomous, they can be held responsible. Unless
human beings are autonomous, responsible agents, the application of
such legal concepts as "fault," "proper care," "negligence," "the reason-
able person," and "the prudent investor" would not make any sense.
The economic theory of law has a very different perspective.
Rather than emphasize fault and responsibility, the economic theory
emphasizes efficiency. Rather than determining what people are owed,
economic theorists look to the future and ask what decision will maxi-
mize utility or personal wealth. This approach changes the way legal
problems are treated. Fuller states:
I should like instead to recall what we would lose if the concept of responsibility
ever disappeared completely from the law. The whole body of the law is permeated
by two recurring standards of decision: fault and intent ...
Notice what happens when these two tests, and their near relatives, fail com-
pletely. . . .In the law of property our familiar standards fail when nature inter-
venes and takes control, as when a river shifts its course, removing twenty acres
from A's land and adding twenty-five to B's. In cases like these the litigants do not
appear as responsible agents, but as the helpless victims of outside forces. We can
no longer ask: Who was to blame? What did they intend? Since our usual stan-
dards of justice fail us, we are at a loss to know what justice requires. If we were to
lose throughout the law the view of man as a responsible center of action, all legal
problems would become like those I have just suggested."
Under the classical view of the law, a lawyer must ask whether a
proposed legal position undermines the purpose of law. Would the legal
position violate any of Fuller's eight conditions? Would it undermine
our view of persons as responsible autonomous agents? If the answer is
in the affirmative, the legal position should not be advanced. This is
the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become,
a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.
Every departure from the principles of the law's inner morality is an affront to man's dignity as a
responsible agent").
36. See generally PLATO, PROTAGORAS (C. Taylor trans. 1976); PLATO, REPUBLIC (A. Lindsay
trans. 1957); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (T. Saunders trans. 1981).
37. See L. FULLER, supra note 33, at 167.
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taking an altruistic view of the law.
To argue that the law is a repository for society's most cherished
values may seem naive and idealistic. But a short excursion into juris-
prudence should convince even the most skeptical that pivotal legal de-
cisions reflect this view. The proper entry to this issue is the discussion
of the relation between law and ethics. Fuller draws a distinction be-
tween the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration."8 The moral-
ity of duty has to do primarily with our obligation to avoid harm. Other
writers have referred to this morality of duty as a "moral minimum. '39
The notion of a moral minimum is crucial to a society. H.L.A. Hart
implicitly adopts this notion when he argues that social life clearly re-
quires rules that at a minimum restrict the free use of violence and
require some form of honesty and truthfulness when dealing with
others.40
These elementary rules are enshrined in the law and are found in
every legal system. However, our own society includes more than this
moral minimum in its list of cherished values and in its legal tradition.
This expanded view is best articulated by Ronald Dworkin. 4'
Legal realists contend that the law is what the judge says it is.42
This view is too simplistic because judges are bound by the plain mean-
ing of statutes, by precedent, by legislative intent, and by other maxims
of interpretation. However, in difficult cases in which the law is ambigu-
ous many argue that the law is what the judge says it is.
Dworkin's view is very different. He contends that in difficult cases
the judge should first appeal to legal principles such as principles of
interpretation and legislative intent. However, if these legal principles
cannot resolve the issue, then the correct legal decision is reached by
appealing to the political and moral tradition in which the law is em-
bedded.43 He also seems to claim that the law must be consistent with
38. Id. ch. I.
39. J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMANN, supra note 23, at 16-21.
40. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 167 (1961). Hart wrote:
Among such rules obviously required for social life are those forbidding, or at least restricting,
the free use of violence, rules requiring certain forms of honesty and truthfulness in dealings
with others, and rules forbidding the destruction of tangible things or their seizure from
others. If conformity with these most elementary rules were not thought a matter of course
among any group of individuals, living in close proximity to each other, we should be doubtful
of the description of the group as a society. ...
Id.
41. Ronald Dworkin's theory of law is found in three books: LAW's EMPIRE (1986); A MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE (1985); TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
42. The best known American realists are Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and John Chipman
Gray.
43. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 41, ch. 4; LAW'S EMPIRE, supra
note 41, chs. 6 & 10.
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those political and moral traditions. Even if Dworkin does not go that
far, adherents to the natural law theory of jurisprudence surely would.
The question now becomes what are these cherished moral values?
Much of the law governing business transactions and relationships
rests on the moral notion of fairness. Fairness is defined in the business
sense as a contract that is made without coercion among people with
approximately equal bargaining strength." For example, in a classic
case, Mr. Henningsen purchased a Plymouth from Bloomfield Motors.45
Later, Mrs. Henningsen was injured when the car suddenly ran off the
road, presumably as a result of a defective steering mechanism. The
defendants, Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, denied re-
sponsibility due to a lack of privity between the defendants and Mrs.
Henningsen. Chrysler had not sold Mr. Henningsen the car and neither
Chrysler nor Bloomfield had sold the car to Mrs. Henningsen. In Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc. the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
jected this defense:
Both defendants contend that since there was no privity of contract between them
and Mrs. Henningsen, she cannot recover for breach of any warranty made by ei-
ther of them. On the facts, as they were developed, we agree that she was not a
party to the purchase agreement. Her right to maintain the action, therefore, de-
pends upon whether she occupies such legal status thereunder as to permit her to
take advantage of a breach of defendants' implied warranties .... We are con-
vinced that the cause of justice in this area of the law can be served only by recog-
nizing that she is such a person who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties
to the warranty, might be expected to become a user of the automobile.46
Manufacturers have also used warranties in the effort to limit legal
liability. In Henningsen the defendants argued that no express or im-
plied warranties existed other than one providing for the replacement
of defective parts. Again, the court appealed to canons of justice in de-
ciding for the plaintiffs:
[W]hat effect should be given to the express warranty in question which seeks to
limit the manufacturer's liability to replacement of defective parts, and which dis-
claims all other warranties, express or implied?...
The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use.. .. He
[the buyer] takes it or leaves it, and he must take it to buy an automobile. No
bargaining is engaged in with respect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it
comes to the buyer is without authority to alter it; his function is ministerial -
simply to deliver it. ...
The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the
automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition among the car mak-
ers in the area of the express warranty. ..
44. Bowie, Fair Markets, J. Bus. ETHICS (forthcoming).
45. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
46. Id. at 99-100 (citation omitted).
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In the context of this warranty, only the abandonment of all sense of justice
would permit us to hold that, as a matter of law, the phrase "its obligation under
this warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof"
signifies to an ordinary reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal in-
jury claim that might flow from the use of a defective automobile ...
.The verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against Chrysler Corporation es-
tablishes that the jury found that the disclaimer was not fairly obtained."'
Another court decision that demonstrates an appeal to general
principles of justice is E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher.48
In Beaumont, Texas, the Dupont Company was constructing a new
plant for making methanol. An unknown third party hired the defend-
ants, Rolfe and Gary Christopher, to fly over the facility and take pho-
tographs. The flyover was discovered, and Dupont sued. In response,
the Christophers said they had done nothing wrong.
In delivering his decision, Judge Goldberg admitted that the Chris-
tophers had neither trespassed, breached a confidential relationship,
nor engaged in other illegal conduct. Judge Goldberg then invoked the
rule from the Restatement of Torts that provides: "One who discloses
or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to
the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means." Judge
Goldberg continued,
The question remaining, therefore, is whether aerial photography of plant construc-
tion is an improper means of obtaining another's trade secret. We conclude that it
is and that the Texas courts would so hold. The Supreme Court of that state has
declared that "the undoubted tendency of the law has been to recognize and en-
force higher standards of commercial morality in the business world."'
A standard defense in a violation of trade secrets case is to show
that the defendant did not protect the trade secret in question. Justice
Goldberg totally rejected that defense in this case.
To require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to guard its secret would
impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick. We
introduce here no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never given moral sanc-
tion to piracy. The market place must not deviate far from our mores. We should
not require a person or corporation to take unreasonable precautions to prevent
another from doing that which he ought not do in the first place.50
Further support comes from the highly controversial Delaware de-
cisions regarding defenses against hostile takeovers.5 1 Unocal Corpora-
tion fought off a bid by T. Boone Pickens Jr.'s Mesa Petroleum Co. by
47. Id. at 84-96 (emphasis in original).
48. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 1015 (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 581-82, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773
(1958)).
50. Id. at 1016-17.
51. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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offering to buy the shares of all stockholders except those held by Mesa.
In other words, the Board of Directors created two distinct classes of
Unocal stockholders and treated them differently. The law permits such
disparate treatment only for a valid corporate purpose; the directors
cannot use it simply to keep themselves in power. Moreover, the moral
principle of "treat equals equally" would prima facie condemn such a
two-tier classification of stockholders.
Much to the dismay of many in the business and financial commu-
nity, the Delaware Supreme Court supported Unocal.2 It did so on the
ground that Unocal's defense was legitimate and proper given the na-
ture of the Mesa threat. In other words, Mesa's behavior was suffi-
ciently unfair and therefore permitted this extraordinary defense.
That the offer was deemed unfair can be extracted from the court's
comments on the case. Central to the issue of fairness was Mesa's two-
tiered stock offer. For the first sixty-four million shares of Unocal stock,
Mesa offered fifty-four dollars a share. For the remaining shares, Mesa
would offer securities allegedly worth fifty-four dollars a share. In fact,
the backing on the remaining shares was such that both the market and
the court termed the securities "junk bonds. '53
In its decision the court acknowledged the coercive nature of the
tender offer.54 Given the nature of the threat, the Unocal response was
legitimate: "Thus, while the exchange offer is a form of selective treat-
ment, given the nature of the threat posed here the response is neither
unlawful nor unreasonable."' 5
These cases indicate that a court will view suspiciously a business
deal which seems coercive or which takes undue advantage of inequality
of bargaining power. This demonstrates that the law enshrines some of
our central values. In addition to fairness, the notions of equality before
the law, procedural due process, individual freedom, equality of oppor-
tunity, and justice are other examples of cherished moral values en-
shrined by the law.
What does this mean with respect to altruistic motivation? An at-
torney must ask whether a proposed legal position would undermine
any of society's cherished values. Would the proposed position under-
mine equal opportunity, procedural due process, or fairness? If the an-
swer is in the affirmative, the legal position should not be undertaken.
Many societies, including our own, consider justice to be funda-
52. Id. at 956.
53. Id.
54. Id. (stating that "[i]t ig now well recognized that such offers are a classic coercive mea-
sure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inade-
quate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the transaction").
55. Id. at 957.
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mental. Nearly all anthologies in jurisprudence contain a section on jus-
tice. Nearly all philosophy of law texts discuss the role of the law in the
promotion of justice.58 Unfortunately, many competing theories of jus-
tice exist. Plato and Aristotle defined justice as giving each person their
due.57 Although that is probably correct, the difficult question is just
postponed. What are people due? An influential contemporary philo-
sophical account analyzes justice in terms of fairness.58 The court cases
cited above show that the notion of justice as fairness fits well within
our tradition. Another traditional view of justice focuses on equal treat-
ment. The great inequality of bargaining power in business seems to
violate fairness. Equal treatment before the law is an explicit moral
value of the legal profession.
In the United States equal treatment involves at least a commit-
ment to equal opportunity. Historically, equal opportunity has been
viewed as the mechanism needed to ensure that all Americans really do
have certain inalienable rights. In fact, America has been characterized
as the land of opportunity because the only constraints on success were
effort and ability. In theory, class or status were irrelevant. Thus a per-
son's happiness depended on what he or she did rather than on charac-
teristics over which a person had no control, such as the status of his or
her parents. Recently, however, the commitment to equal opportunity
has been criticized as insufficient for achieving justice.59 Even if these
critics are right, there is a consensus that equal opportunity is at least a
necessary condition for justice. To what would equal opportunity
amount in the context of law?
A person has equal opportunity before the law only if he or she has
access to legal advice. How can a client have equal opportunity before
the law if he or she cannot afford an attorney? Society supports equal
opportunity by providing public education on the grounds that equal
opportunity does not amount to much in the absence of a basic educa-
tion. Similarly, society should ensure that legal assistance is available
for all. In the age of specialization, people are legally ignorant and espe-
cially in need of counsel.6 0 Without access to legal advice, equal oppor-
tunity before the law does not exist.
56. In addition to R. DWORKIN, supra note 41; L. FULLER, supra note 33; and H. HART, supra
note 40; see READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (J. Arthur & W. Shaw eds. 1984); M. GOLDING, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW (1974); and E. KENT, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1970).
57. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs bk. V, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (R.
McKeon ed. 1941); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC ch. XII (F. Cornford trans. 1967).
58. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIE ch. 1 (1971).
59. See, e.g., J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY (1983); K. NIELSEN,
EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: A DEFENSE OF RADICAL EGALITARIANISM (1985); Schaar, Equality of Oppor-
tunity and Beyond, in Equality NOMOS IX (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967).
60. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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A more complicated issue arises when one focuses on the quality of
legal advice. Not only should all people have access to legal advice, they
should have access to good legal advice. What constitutes good legal
advice? Do corporate clients and the clients of overburdened public de-
fenders receive the same caliber of legal advice? This is a difficult issue,
but the legal profession should address it.
We can now summarize what altruistic motivation in the law
amounts to. In addition to asking whether a proposed legal position un-
dermines the purpose of law or society's cherished values, the legal
community must also ask whether its organization and structure under-
mine justice-particularly equal opportunity before the law.
This analysis provides the theoretical grounds to endorse the gen-
eral recommendations of the Commission on Professionalism. The
Commission's recommendations are consistent with the professional
view of law. More specifically, these recommendations would assist the
legal profession to meet its obligations to support the moral and politi-
cal values that underlie the law-especially the values of equal opportu-
nity, fairness, equality before the law, and justice. The Commission
reminds lawyers of their obligation to the public interest and to partici-
pate in pro bono activities. Perhaps more should be done. The ABA
might levy a tax on major law firms the proceeds of which would subsi-
dize firms specializing in defending the poor.
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
Whereas the traditional account of law supports professionalism in
the classical sense, the economic analysis of law undermines profession-
alism. Let us contrast the traditional approach with the economic anal-
ysis of law. Among the defenders of the economic approach is Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.61 The best known spokesperson, however, is Judge
Richard A. Posner, and the classic text is his Economic Analysis of
Law.62 According to economic theorists, legal conflicts are to be resolved
efficiently, and efficient solutions are determined by the willingness of
people to pay. To determine the efficient allocation of tax dollars for
medical research and highways, the economic theorist needs to know
how much people are willing to pay for medical research and highways.
Posner's approach to law is to treat legal issues analogously to these.
Three examples should illustrate Posner's approach.
61. Academic defenders include: Gary S. Becker, Guido Calabresi, Isaac Ehrlich, Richard A.
Epstein, Victor Goldberg, Werner Z. Hirsch, and Oliver F. Williamson.
62. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). The second edition was published in 1977
and is the edition most often cited.
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First, when Congress granted the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) the power to allocate broadcast frequencies, rights were
granted to those who could persuade the FCC that granting them a li-
cense would promote the public interest. Moreover, Congress provided
expressly that licensees were to have no property rights in the frequen-
cies assigned to them. Posner argues that such regulation is inefficient
and notes that, in fact, the granting of licenses approximates the will-
ingness to pay criteria."
Second, Posner would permit more discrimination than is tradi-
tionally allowed. The traditional view argues that race, creed, color, sex,
or national origin are to be considered irrelevant in employment, educa-
tion, or for equal tleatment under the law in the absence of a compel-
ling state interest. But Posner argues that such an attitude is inefficient
in those cases in which a characteristic like race is correlated positively
to some undesirable characteristic. In such cases it is justified statisti-
cally to discriminate on the basis of race.64
Posner appeals to the notion of statistical discrimination. "Statisti-
cal discrimination" occurs whenever an individual is judged on the basis
of the average characteristics of the group, or groups, to which he or she
belongs rather than upon his or her own personal characteristics. The
judgments are correct, factual, and objective in the sense that the group
actually has the characteristics that are ascribed to it, but the judg-
ments are incorrect with respect to many individuals within the
group."6 5 Although Posner will not say that all such instances of statis-
tical discrimination are lawful, he contends that many such cases might
be upheld on efficiency grounds.6
Third, to see how far Posner is willing to take that analysis, con-
sider his argument on behalf of legalizing baby sales. Briefly but fairly
summarized, Posner argues as follows: First, the supply of babies for
adoption is too low because of the availability of contraception and
abortion and the fact that there is no longer much stigma to being an
unwed mother.6 7 Also, there are many people who have children but do
not want to raise them.68 If you had a market in babies, more people
could adopt 'children at a lower cost "since the costs of production by
the natural parents are typically much lower than the value that many
childless people attach to the possession of children. There is in fact a
63. R. POSNER, supra note 62, at 31-34.
64. Id. at 533-38.
65. L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALrrY: MECHANISMS OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
172 (1975).
66. R. POSNER, supra note 62, at 537.




black market in babies with prices as high as $25,000 reported re-
cently. '69 Therefore, according to the economic analysis of law, babies
should be bought and sold.
This economic analysis of the law stands in sharp contrast to the
traditional view. Judge Easterbrook criticized the traditional view, stat-
ing that "[e]conomic analysis helps people shape questions to take max-
imum advantage of scarce knowledge. If lawyers and judges start from
scratch in wrestling with a problem, they will be driven to consult their
intuitions for answers. '70
But of course lawyers and judges do not start from scratch and
even in hard cases, they consult the political and legal tradition. Eco-
nomic analysis is not the only source for objectivity in legal decisions.
Precedents, statutes, rules of interpretation, legislative intent, and fi-
nally, the political and moral values of the society all provide the re-
quired objectivity. The economic analysis of law is flawed not only in its
pretentious claim that only it can provide objectivity, but also in its
inability to address the issue of altruistic motivation.
A lawyer is altruistically motivated if she tests any proposed legal
position or the organization and structure of the law against the pur-
pose of law, society's cherished values, and justice-particularly equal
opportunity before the law. What does the economic analysis of law
have to say about these three issues?
First, the efficiency criterion is frequently in conflict with the tradi-
tional view of law as "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules. ' 71 Under that view, the law enables people to ac-
complish their goals either individually or in interaction with others. If
there is a transgression, the law looks back to the transgression to de-
termine whether the individual was at fault or whether there were miti-
gating conditions. Notions of fault and mitigating conditions are of
little interest to those who adhere to the economic analysis of law.
Posner's remarks about a market in babies demonstrate his lack of
concern with society's cherished values. The economic analysis of law
assumes that the market perspective is the only appropriate perspective
for dealing with social problems. Posner completely ignores the fact
that this society has decided that the most intimate of human relation-
ships lie beyond the market. Society has decided that a market in sex
and a market in babies is illegitimate per se. Moreover, the law has
recognized that society can choose to be inefficient.72
69. Id. at 113.
70. Easterbrook, Afterword: Knowledge and Answers, 85 COLUm. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1985).
71. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
72. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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A view of law that puts a price on everything makes the law unpro-
fessional. Some aspects of life exist in which a market model should not
prevail. The law should constrain the market; the law should not be
judged on market grounds. Many legal decisions are fundamentally dif-
ferent from economic ones and are not concerned with issues of effi-
ciency. Rather, they are concerned with just compensation and conduct.
The most serious objection to the economic analysts is their pro-
pensity to ignore distributional issues totally. For example, in response
to the criticism that an efficient solution would put the broadcast in-
dustry into the hands of the wealthy, Judge Posner says, "This confuses
willingness to pay with the ability to pay."'7 3 Posner's one sentence as-
sertion does not constitute an argument. It does reflect Posner's general
attitude toward the distributional effects of the economic analysis of
law.
The failure to consider distributional issues has not gone unno-
ticed. In a symposium published in the Columbia Law Review, Profes-
sor Bruce Ackerman noted:
[W]e must reflect more deeply upon the normative conditions a bargain must sat-
isfy before it should count as "genuine" and demarcate more clearly the legal
problems which may appropriately be treated as genuine bargains.., just as you
and I could not have bargained over our primary education, so too we could not
have bargained over our initial endowments of material goods or genetic abilities.
Yet it is these initial endowments that profoundly shape our success in real-world
bargaining throughout our lives.
Is it not past time, then, for lawyer-economists to recognize up front that you
and I were not born yesterday? 74
Indeed, a philosophy of law that refuses to address distributional ques-
tions is likely to ignore how proposed legal defenses or the law itself
affect equality before the law. It is hard to be concerned about access to
legal services if you think such access confuses willingness to pay with
the ability to pay.75
VI. CONCLUSION
The specialization of lawyers and the growth of large law firms are
necessary to meet the epistemological requirements of professionalism.
If this makes the law more like a business, there is nothing morally
objectionable. However, to the extent that lawyers abandon altruistic
motivation and become more like traditionally characterized business
73. R. POSNER, supra note 62, at 31.
74. Ackerman, Foreword: Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 899, 903, 901-02 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
75. In some respects this criticism is a slight over simplification. Posner, for example, does
discuss justice, see supra note 62, at 22-23, and he has written extensively on justice. His numerous
law review and journal articles have been collected in a book, THE EcoNoMics OF JusTicE (1981).
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persons, the profession should feel considerable unease. To ignore the
law's impact on the purpose of law, society's central values, and jus-
tice-primarily understood as equality before the law-is to abandon
one's claim toward being a profession. Society should seek to make bus-
iness a profession rather than to make law a business.

